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Abstract—The number of malware variants is growing 
tremendously and the study of malware attacks on the Internet 
is still a demanding research domain.  In this research, various 
logs from different OSI layer are explore to identify the traces 
leave on the attacker and victim logs, and the attack worm trace 
pattern are establish in order to reveal true attacker or victim.  
For the purpose of this paper, it will only concentrate on 
cybercrime that caused by malware network intrusion and used 
the traditional worm namely blaster worm variants.  This 
research creates the concept of trace pattern by fusing the 
attacker’s and victim’s perspective.  Therefore, the objective of 
this paper is to propose on attacker’s, victim’s and multi-step 
(attacker/victim)’s trace patterns by combining both 
perspectives.  These three proposed worm trace patterns can be 
extended into research areas in alert correlation and computer 
forensic investigation. 
 




Nowadays the numbers of cases of internet threat causes 
by malware have been tremendously increased. Malware that 
consist of Trojan, virus and worm had threatened the internet 
user and causes billion of losses to the internet users around 
the world.  The exponential growth of malware variants as 
reported by AV-test.org [1] is quite alarming. This can be 
seen from the higher growth rate of the malware collection 
shown in the graph of the new malware samples over the last 
several years as depicted in Fig.1.   
 
 
Fig. 1  The continuous growth of the number of malware [1] 
 
In the report, the numbers of malware is not cumulative 
where they represent only the new variants in the time frame 
specified without including the previously identified ones.  
This does not mean that there are only unique pieces of 
malware as there are also many variants of the same pieces 
of malware.  Variants are often created to defeat the security 
tools, for instance a worm can mutate to a different variants, 
sometimes in only one hour [2]. Thus make it difficult for 
security tool to detect the threat. 
 
Due to this reason the study of attacks on the internet has 
becoming an important research domain. The study on 
internet attack is very crucial, especially in developing an 
effective security tool to defend the internet user from the 
attack threat. Collecting data related to Internet threats has 
become a relatively common task for security researchers 
and from the data the researcher can investigate the attack 
pattern in order to find the root cause and effect of an attack.  
Attack pattern can also be used as a guide to the investigator 
for collecting and tracing the evidence in forensic field [3]. 
According to [4], the anatomy of attack consists of attacker 
and victim perspective.  
 
To address this challenge, this paper propose on 
attacker’s, victim’s and multi-step (attacker/victim)’s trace 
patterns by collaborate both attacker and victim perspectives.  
This research explore the various logs from different OSI 
layer to identify the traces leave on the attacker and victim 
logs, and establish the attack trace pattern in order to reveal 
true attacker or victim. The research only focuses on 
cybercrime that caused by malware network intrusion 
specifically traditional worm namely blaster worm variants. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
A. Blaster Worm 
Generally malware consists of virus, worm and trojan 
horse [5].  For the purpose of this research, the researchers 
focuses on one types of worm that described by [6], which is 
traditional worm specifically blaster worm.   
 
Blaster uses a public exploit for the RPC DCOM 
vulnerability in order to obtain a system-level command shell 
on its victims [7].  The worm start searching for IP addresses 
at a time for hosts with listening TCP port 135 open by 
sending a connection attempt to each one simultaneously.  
Once found, it tries to figure out the windows version and 
then sends the RPC DCOM exploit that binds a system level 
shell to TCP port 4444.  Once the target is successfully 
compromised, the worm transmits the msblast.exe executable 
via TFTP on UDP port 69 to infect the host where the 
payloads used in the public DCOM exploit, as well as the 
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TFTP functionality, are both encapsulated within msblast.exe.  
Once the executable has been transferred, or after 20 seconds 
have elapsed, the TFTP server is shut down and the worm 
then issues further commands to the victim to execute 
msblast.exe [8].  Assuming the executable was downloaded 
successfully, the propagation cycle then begins again from 
the newly infected host, while the infecting instance of the 
worm continues iterating through IP addresses. 
 
B. Trace Pattern 
Trace is described as a process of finding or discovering 
the origin or cause of certain scenario and pattern is defined 
as a regular way in which certain scenario happened [9].  
Trace pattern is essential in assisting the investigators tracing 
the evidence found at crime scenes.  In the computer crime 
perspective, it can be found in any digital devices. These 
traces consist in a variety of data records their activities such 
as login and logout to the system, visit of pages, documents 
accesses, items created and affiliation to groups.  Traces data 
are typically stored in log files and normally takes on several 
selected attributes such as port, action, protocol, source IP 
address and destination IP address.   
 
The trace data can be used to identify a victim or attacker 
by analyzing the attack pattern which is represented in the 
form of trace pattern can helps determine how a crime is 
being committed. Attack pattern is type of pattern that is 
specified from attacker perspective. The pattern describes 
how an attack is performed, enumerates the security patterns 
that can be applied to defeat the attack, and describes how to 
trace the attack once it has occurred [10].  
 
An attack pattern provides a systematic description of the 
attack goals and attack strategies for defending against and 
tracing the attack.  Hence, attack patterns can guide forensic 
investigators in searching the evidence and the patterns can 
serve as a structured method for obtaining and representing 
relevant network forensic information.  This also helps the 
forensic investigator at the data collection phase that requires 
the investigator to determine and identifying all the 
components to be collected, deciding the priority of the data, 
finding the location of the components and collecting data 
from each of the component during the investigation process 
[11].  
 
Various descriptions provided by several researchers to 
describe the term attack pattern.  According to [12], they use 
the term attack pattern to describe the steps in a generic 
attack. Meanwhile, [13] describe the term attack pattern as 
the attack steps, attack goal, pre-conditions and post-
conditions of an attack. [14] describe an attack pattern as the 
approach used by attackers to generate an exploit against 
software in which it is a general framework for carrying out a 
particular type of attack, such as a method for exploiting a 
buffer overflow or an interposition attack that leverages 
certain kinds of architectural weaknesses.  
 
Although there are different descriptions provided by 
several researchers, they have the same idea and concept that 
the attack pattern is very important to provide a way to 
protect them from any potential attack. For example, 
software developers use attack pattern to learn about how 
their software may be attacked.  Armed with knowledge 
about potential attacks, developers can take steps to mitigate 
the impact of these attacks. Similarly, network administrator 
or network engineers use attack pattern to study on how the 
potential attacker attack their network in order to detect and 
block any vulnerabilities in their network. 
 
The study from [12][13][14] discussed the concept of 
attack patterns as a mechanism to capture and communicate 
at the attacker’s perspective that shows the common methods 
for exploiting software, system or network  while [10] and 
[11] discussed on the attack pattern on how the attack is 
performed, the attack goals, how to defences against the 
attack and how to trace once it has occurred.  
 
All of the researchers are only focusing on the attacker’s 
perspective while victim’s perspective is omitted.  Therefore, 
this research proposed the trace patterns by focusing on the 
attacker’s, victim’s and attacker/victim’s (multi-step) 
perspectives to provide clear view on how the attacker 
performed the attack and what is the impact caused by the 
attack.   
 
Multi-step perspective proposed in this research is 
motivated based on the study by [15] in order to reveal the 
true attacker or victim. A multi-step attack is a sequence of 
attack steps that an attacker has performed, where each step 
of the attack is dependent on the successful completion of the 
previous step. These attack steps are the scan followed by the 
break-in to the host and the tool-installation, and finally an 
internal scan originating from the compromised host [16]. 
 
In the next section, researchers present the experimental 
approach used in this research to gather and analyse logs for 
designing the proposed worm trace pattern. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
 
This experimental approach used four phases: Network 
Environment Setup, Attack Activation, Trace Pattern Log 
Collection and Trace Pattern Log Analysis. Further details on 
these phases are explained as follows and depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2  Trace Pattern Experimental Approach Framework 
 
A. Network Environment Setup 
The network environment setup use in this experiment is 
following the network simulation setup done by the MIT 
Lincoln Lab [17] and it only consists of Centos and 
Windows XP operating systems to suit our experiment’s 
environment. The network design is shown in Fig. 3.  
 
This network design consists of two switches, one router, 
three servers for Intrusion Detection System (IDS Arowana 
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and IDS Sepat) and Network Time Protocol (NTP) run on 
Centos 4.0, seven victims and one attacker run on Windows 
XP. 
 
Fig. 3  Network Setup Environment for Blaster Trace Pattern 
 
In this experiment, host 192.168.2.10 (Tarmizi) is 
Attacker, host 192.168.4.20 (Sahib) and 192.168.11.20 
(Yusof) are the selected Victims for this research.  The log 
files that are expected to be analyzed are personal firewall 
log, security log, system log and application log. Each log 
are generated by host level device and one log files by 
network level device (alert log by IDS). Wireshark were 
installed in each host and tcpdump script is activated in IDS 
to capture the whole network traffic.  The Wireshark and 
tcpdump script were used to verify the traffic between 
particular host and other device. 
 
B. Attack Activation 
The attacker machine, Tarmizi is selected to launch the 
Blaster variant attack. This experiment runs for one hour 
without any human interruption in order to obtain the 
attacker and victim logs. 
 
C. Trace Pattern Log Collection 
Each machine generated personal firewall log, security 
log, application log, system log and wireshark log. The IDS 
machine generates alert log and tcpdump log.  The trace 
pattern logs are collected at each victim and attacker machine.  
The wireshark and tcpdump files are used to verify the traffic 
between particular host and other device. 
 
D. Trace Pattern Log Analysis 
In this trace pattern log analysis process the researchers 
analyze the logs generated by the attacker and victim 
machine. The objective of the trace pattern log analysis is to 
identify the victim and attacker trace pattern by observing the 
traces leave on the selected logs. The output from the 
analysis is used to construct worm trace pattern as proposed 
in Section V. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
The researchers have collected all logs generated during 
the experiment and the attack scenario is identified.  Based 
on the scenario, various logs from attacker’s host, victim’s 
host, and network are analyzed. 
A. Attack Scenario 
The attack scenario as depicted in Fig. 4 is derived based 
on the log analysis in the experimental approach framework 
in section III. 
 
 
Fig. 4  Blaster Attack Scenario 
 
Based on the analysis, the worm attack is activated in 
Tarmizi and successfully exploited all hosts that mark with 
135, 4444 and 69 except for host Yusof and Selamat. These 
hosts was mark with 135 and 4444 and indicated that the 
attacker is already open the backdoor but unable to transfer 
the malicious codes through port 69.  Then, one of the 
infected hosts that are Sahib has organized attack on host 
Yusof. 
 
B. Trace Pattern Analysis 
The purpose of trace pattern analysis is to construct the 
victim’s, attacker’s and multi-step (victim/attacker)’s trace 
pattern by observing the traces leave on the selected logs.  
The various logs involve in this analysis are host logs:  
personal firewall log, security log, system log, application 
log and network logs: alert log by IDS.  Based on the attack 
scenario described previously, the logs are further analyzed 
to extract the trace pattern generated by the attack from the 
attacker’s and victim’s machine by tracing the fingerprints 
emerged in the logs.  
 
In this analysis, the researchers have selected Sahib and 
Yusof as victims; and Tarmizi as attacker as shown in Fig. 3.  
The tracing tasks involve the log from devices at host and 
network level and initially started at victim’s logs followed 
by attacker’s logs: personal firewall log, security log, system 
log and application log.  The network logs are used to 
complement the finding from the host level tracing tasks.  
The details of the analysis for victim, attacker and multi-step 
attack (attacker/victim) trace pattern are further elaborated in 
the next sub-section. 
 
1) Victim’s Traces 
The victim’s data traces are extracted from the logs at the 
victim’s host and network log.  The summary of the data 
traces are depicted in Fig. 5 and the evidences are found in 
personal firewall log, security log, system log and 
application log and the details of the traces are discussed.
3 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 7, No. 1, 2010 
 
 
Fig. 5  Summary of Blaster Traces on Victim’s Log 
 
In Personal Firewall log, ports 135 TCP, 4444 TCP and 
69 UDP are considered as part of this victim’s trace pattern 
due to the information gain from [7], [18] and [19].  These 
ports are known as vulnerable ports that can be used by 
malicious codes to exploit the system-level command shell 
on its victims. These ports also provide an inter-process 
communication mechanism that allows programs running on 
one host to execute code on remote hosts [20]. 
 
The source IP address of OPEN-INBOUND TCP 
indicates the remote host and the source IP address of OPEN 
UDP indicates the local host.  While the destination IP 
address of OPEN-INBOUND TCP indicates the local host 
and the destination IP address of OPEN UDP indicates the 
remote host. The summarized of the IP address dependency 
is depicted in TABLE 1. 
 
TABLE 1: IP ADDRESS DEPENDENCY 




OPEN-INBOUND Remote Host Local Host 
OPEN Local Host Remote Host 
 
The patterns of the communication between Source IP 
address and Destination IP address indicate that the local 
host has permitted the TFTP service and the incoming traffic 
from the remote host. All communication activity is done by 
vulnerable ports open exploitation.   
 
In Security log, the traces data from the security log 
shows that there is a new process created by system proves 
by the existence of event id 592.  It has initiated the TFTP 
service used to download and upload the blaster worm code 
and execute the remote blaster worm code (msblast.exe).  
This activity is logged in Image File Name as %WINDIR%\ 
System32\tftp.exe and %WINDIR%\System32\msblast.exe. 
 
System log shows the traces data of the Blaster-infected 
machine stops its TFTP daemon after a transmission or after 
20 seconds of TFTP inactivity by showing the new process 
created on event id 7031 and 1074 that indicates the RPC 
service terminated unexpectedly and windows restart 
respectively.  
 
The alert IDS log shows that there is an activity called 
TFTP Get is occurred on port 69 UDP where the source IP 
4 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 7, No. 1, 2010 
address from alert IDS log is similar as the destination IP 
address in the victim’s firewall log and vice versa. These 
traces identify that there is a pattern exists on how the blaster 
worm initiates the client to download the worm code.  The 
Source IP address is the victim and the Destination IP 
address is the attacker. 
 
Action OPEN-INBOUND, OPEN-INBOUND and OPEN 
are known as a complete sequence of communication of 
blaster worm to gain access and upload the malicious codes 
to be exploited [21] where the OPEN action shows that an 
outbound session was opened to a remote host and the 
OPEN-INBOUND action shows that an inbound session was 
opened to  the local host 
 
2) Attacker’s Traces  
The attacker’s data traces are extracted from the logs at 
the attacker’s host and network log.  The summary of the 
data traces on the attacker’s and network logs are illustrated 
in Fig. 6 and the evidences are found in personal firewall 
log, security log, system log and application log and the 
details of the traces of the attacker’s logs are discussed as 
following. 
 
The traces data leaved in attacker’s Personal Firewall 
Log shown the vulnerable ports that are used by the attacker 
to exploit the system-level command shell on its victims. The 
pattern of the traces data are OPEN TCP 135, OPEN TCP 
4444 and OPEN-INBOUND UDP 69 as referred to [7], [18] 
and [19].   
 
The source IP address of OPEN TCP indicates the local 
host and the destination IP address action indicates the 
remote host. While, the source IP address of OPEN-
INBOUND UDP indicates the remote host and the 
destination IP address indicates the local host.   
 
The patterns of source IP address and destination IP 
address indicate that the local host is opened an outbound 
session to the remote host which allow the local host transmit 
the payload (worm codes) to the remote host by exploiting 
the vulnerable ports open. The traces data from the security 
log shows that there is a new process created (Event ID: 592) 
that shows the blaster worm is activated based on the trace 
shows on the image file name. 
 
In the alert IDS log, (Portscan) TCP Portsweep presents 
the pattern of scanning activity which shows the behavior of 
traditional worm attack in general and blaster worm attack in 
specific [22].  Therefore, this trace discovers that the owner 
of the source IP address is a potential attacker who launched 
the worm. 
 
3) Multi-step (Attacker/Victim) Trace Pattern 
Based on the extracted data from the logs at the victim’s 
host and network log, the multi-step (Attacker/Victim)’s 
traces data is identified.  The summary of the data traces on 
the multi-step and network logs are represented in Fig. 7 and 
the evidences are found in personal firewall log, security log, 
system log and application log and the details of the traces of 
the multi-step’s logs are discussed. 
 
There are two different patterns existing in personal 
firewall log that discover attacker and victim traces as shown 






Fig. 6  Summary of Blaster Traces on Attacker’s Log 
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Fig. 7: Blaster Traces on Multi-step (Victim/Attacker) Log 
 
 
TABLE 2: TRACES DATA ON PERSONAL FIREWALL LOG 
Victim Attacker 
Action, Protocol and 
Destination port:  
 
OPEN-INBOUND TCP 135, 
OPEN-INBOUND TCP 4444 and 
OPEN UDP 69 - These ports are 
known as vulnerable ports that 
provide hole and opportunities to 
the attacker to exploit in order to 
gain access to the system. 
Action, Protocol and 
Destination port:  
 
OPEN TCP 135, OPEN TCP 
4444and OPEN -INBOUND 
UDP 69 - These ports are 
known as vulnerable ports that 
can be used by the attacker to 
exploit the system-level 
command shell on its victims. 
Source IP Address and 
Destination IP Address:  
 
OPEN-INBOUND TCP - the 
source IP address indicates the 
remote host and the destination IP 
address indicates the local host.  
OPEN UDP - the source IP address 
indicates the local host and the 
destination IP address indicates the 
remote host. 
Source IP Address and 
Destination IP Address: 
  
OPEN TCP - the source IP 
address indicates the local host 
and the destination IP address 
indicates the remote host.  
OPEN-INBOUND UDP - the 
source IP address indicates the 
remote host and the destination 
IP address indicates the local 
host. 
From the victim perspective (OPEN-INBOUND TCP 135, 
OPEN-INBOUND TCP 4444 and OPEN UDP 69), the 
patterns shows that the source IP address and destination IP 
address indicate that the local host is permitted the TFTP 
service and the incoming traffic from the remote host.  
 
While, from the attacker perspective (OPEN TCP 135, 
OPEN TCP 4444 and OPEN -INBOUND UDP 69), the 
patterns of source IP address and destination IP address 
indicate that the local host is opened an outbound session to 
the remote host which allow the local host transmit the 
payload (worm codes) to the remote host.  
 
All communication activity is done by vulnerable ports 
open exploitation. Therefore, the traces data found are 
significant to the multi-step attack (victim/attacker) where 
this host was infected (act as victim) and as long as the 
computer was infected with the worm code (msblast), it (act 
as attacker) continued to generate traffic to attempt to infect 
other vulnerable computers [23]. 
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The traces data in TABLE 3 are taken from the security 
log in Fig. 9 and it shows that there is a new process created 
by system which initiates the TFTP service. This service is 
used to receive and sent the blaster worm code and execute 
the blaster worm code (msblast.exe) remotely. 
 
TABLE 3: TRACES DATA ON SECURITY LOG 
Victim Attacker 
Event ID: 592 Event ID: 592 
User ID: System User ID: S-1-5-21-725345543-
1547161642-839522115-1003 
 









The pattern in TABLE 3 has indicates that this host is a 
victim of blaster worm attack. Another traces data found is a 
new process created (Event ID: 592) by unidentified user (S-
1-5-21-725345543-1547161642-839522115-1003) which 
executed the msblast as shown on the image file name. It 
identify that this host was infected previously and 
automatically attempt to transfer the worm code by 
generating traffic to exploit other vulnerable computers.  
 
System log shows the traces data of the Blaster-infected 
machine stops by showing the new process created on event 
id 7031 and 1074 that indicates the RPC service terminated 
unexpectedly and windows restart respectively. This pattern 
is significant with the victim pattern in which if the host is 
infected by blaster worm, the RPC service is terminated 
unexpectedly by exploiting the RPC DCOM and force the 
windows restart. 
 
As depicted in TABLE 4, the alert IDS log shows that 
there are traces found on TFTP Get and (Portscan) TCP 
Portsweep activities for victim and attacker respectively.  
 
The TFTP Get activity on port 69 trace indicates that 
there is a pattern exists on how the blaster worm initiates the 
client to download the worm code.  The source IP address is 
the victim and the destination IP address is the attacker.  On 
the other hand, the (Portscan) TCP Portsweep trace proves 
that there is scanning activity on the vulnerable open port. 
This trace indicates that the source IP address is the attacker 
who activated the worm. Both traces found in TABLE 4 are 
significant to the pattern that found in victim and attacker as 
depicted in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. 
 
TABLE 4: TRACES DATA ON ALERT IDS LOG 
Victim Attacker 
Message: TFTP Get 
 
Message: (Portscan) TCP 
Portsweep 
 
Source IP Address and Destination IP 
Address:  
Source IP address indicates the victim and 
the Destination IP address indicates the 
attacker 
 
Source IP Address:  
Source IP address indicates 
the attacker  
Destination Port: 69  
 
Based on the analysis, the researchers have identified the 
significant attributes from the victim, attacker and multi-step 
traces data. These findings are further use to construct the 
proposed worm trace pattern. 
 
V. PROPOSED WORM TRACE PATTERN 
 
This research proposed the worm trace pattern based on 
victim, attacker and multi-step point of view. The following 
section describes the details. 
 
A. Victim’s Trace Pattern 
Victim’s trace pattern is useful for forensic in order to 
provide clear view on how the victim attacked by the 
potential attacker. According to the analysis and findings 
from Fig. 5, the overall Blaster victim’s trace pattern is 
summarized in Fig.8. 
 
 
Fig.8  Proposed Blaster Victim’s Trace Pattern 
In Fig. 8, the traces data indicated the blaster worm 
pattern at the victim’s host used port 135 TCP to permit the 
scanning and transmitting RPC DCOM exploit codes from 
remote host which launch the windows shell to initiate worm 
code download used port 4444 TCP.  
 
Then it launched the TFTP client service using port 69 for 
downloading the worm code. The traces on TFTP Get on 
port 69 UDP also found in the network log that supports all 
the traces found on the host log. 
 
B. Attacker’s Trace Pattern 
Attacker’s trace pattern provides a systematic description 
of the attack goals and attack strategies for defending against 
and tracing the attack. This pattern is useful to guide forensic 
investigators in searching the evidence and provide a 
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structured method for obtaining and representing relevant 




Fig. 9  Proposed Blaster Attacker’s Trace Pattern 
 
The overall Blaster attacker’s trace pattern depicted in Fig. 
9 indicate the blaster worm pattern at the attacker’s host used 
port 135 TCP to allow the local host scan and transmit RPC 
DCOM exploit codes to the remote host which launch the 
windows shell to initiate worm code download used port 
4444 TCP. Then it launched the TFTP client service using 
port 69 to permit the client (remote host) download the worm 
code from the local host. The activity of TCP Portsweep 
trace also existed in the network log that supports all the 
traces found on the host log.  
 
C. Multi-step (Attacker/Victim) Trace Pattern 
 
Multi-step’s trace pattern is used as a guide for forensic 
investigators to reveal and prove the true attacker or victim. 
This trace pattern is a combination of victim’s and 
attacker’s trace pattern in which the traces data is extracted 
from a log for the same host. 
 
The traces data on multi-step at the host’s logs from 
victim/attacker perspective illustrated in Fig. 10 indicate that 
the blaster worm used port 135 TCP to permit the scanning 
activity and it is supported by the traces found in network 
logs that show (Portscan) TCP Portsweep activities. 
 
The worm then transmit RPC DCOM exploit codes from 
remote host which launch the windows shell to initiate 
downloading the worm code using port 4444 TCP and it 
launched the TFTP client service on port 69.  This worm 
activity is shown by the traces found in network logs that 
confirm the existence of TFTP Get on port 69 UDP activities.  
Once the host is infected (act as victim), it’s (act as attacker) 
then generate traffic; attempt to infect other vulnerable hosts.  
 
The source IP address from host log indicates that the 
remote host is the victim and the destination IP address 
which is the local host is the attacker. Hence, multi-step 
(victim/attacker) trace pattern could identify the true victim 
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Fig. 10  Proposed Multi-step (Victim/Attacker) Trace Pattern 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
Trace pattern of an attack in an attack scenario is 
constructed by analyzing various logs from heterogeneous 
devices in victim, attacker and victim/attacker (multi-step) 
perspectives. These trace patterns offer a systematic 
description of the impact of the attack, the attack goals and 
attack steps along with strategies for defending against and 
tracing the attack.  For example, personal firewall logs 
provide information on how the attacker entered the network 
and how the exploits were performed; meanwhile event 
logging such as security log, system log and application log 
enables network administrators to collect important 
information such as date, time and result of each action 
during the setup and execution of an attack. Therefore, the 
propose victim, attacker and multi-step (victim/attacker) 
trace patterns in this paper can be extended into research 
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